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Abstract
Industrial control systems (ICS) have been mov-
ing from dedicated communications to switched and
routed corporate networks, making it probable that
these devices are being exposed to the Internet. Many
ICS have been designed with poor or little security
features, making them vulnerable to potential at-
tack. Recently, several tools have been developed that
can scan the internet, including ZMap, Masscan and
Shodan. However, little in-depth analysis has been
done to compare these Internet-wide scanning tech-
niques, and few Internet-wide scans have been con-
ducted targeting ICS and protocols.
In this paper we present a Taxonomy of Internet-
wide scanning with a comparison of three popular net-
work scanning tools, and a framework for conducting
Internet-wide scans.
Keywords: Internet-wide scanning, Taxonomy,
Framework, Industrial Control Systems, Critical In-
frastructure, SCADA, ZMap, Masscan, Shodan.
1 Introduction
With the exhaustion of the IPv4 address pool, and
the slow adoption of IPv6, researchers have the op-
portunity to conduct Internet-wide surveys for re-
search. In the past few years, there have been several
Internet-wide scans conducted by different organisa-
tions worldwide. With recent advances in Internet-
wide scanning tools, computational power, and net-
work bandwidth, the required time to scan the IPv4
address space has been dramatically reduced. It is
now possible to scan the entire public IPv4 Internet
in as little as three minutes (Graham, 2013b). Several
tools currently exist which allow scans of the IPv4 in-
ternet, including ZMap, Masscan, Unicornscan and
Shodan.
ICS have been moving from traditional serial com-
munications to switched and routed corporate net-
works, either directly connected through ethernet or
through devices to enable serial to ethernet conver-
sion. These ethernet networks allow for easy ac-
cess, management and operation of the devices, how-
ever connection to corporate networks can allow the
devices to be directly accessible from the Internet
(Hoover, 2013).
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However, there is currently no framework for con-
ducing Internet-wide scans, no comparison between
commonly used Internet-wide scanning techniques
has been made, and few Internet-wide scans have been
conducted for Internet accessible ICS devices.
2 Background
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) EFF SSL
Observatory project conducted an Internet-wide scan
for study (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014).
From this dataset, the EFF were able to ask key ques-
tions about the existing state of SSL Certificates on
the internet, including the number of trusted Certifi-
cate Authorities (CAs), number of signers, and fre-
quency of use. The EFF found there were a large
amount of weak and vulnerable certificates.
The Internet Census (2012) was a distributed scan
of the IPv4 Internet using the Carna Botnet, which
infected over 400,000 embedded devices (Anonymous,
2012). Using the NMap Scripting Engine, the botnet
was designed to initially scan random addresses, at-
tempt a telnet login, and upload a small binary to
infected devices which then was used to scan the In-
ternet This distributed method of scanning the Inter-
net dramatically reduced the time of the scan, from
potentially months to hours.
Mining your Ps and Qs was a distributed scan of
the IPv4 Internet using the NMap network mapping
tool; the largest network survey of TLS and SSH
servers at the time. The goal of the project was
to search for TLS certificates with problems related
to inadequate randomness upon generation (Heninger
et al., 2012).
ZMap, created by a team from the University
of Michigan (Durumeric et al., 2013), provides sev-
eral improvements over traditional port-scanning pro-
grams such as NMap, used duringthe EFF SSL Ob-
servatory project, Internet Census, and the Mining
your Ps and Qs scans (Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, 2014; Anonymous, 2012; Heninger et al., 2012).
The ZMap tool dramatically reduces the time of scan-
ning from days to as little as 45 minutes (Durumeric
et al., 2013). In response to the release of ZMap, a
new Internet-wide scanning tool Masscan was devel-
oped, which further reduces the time of scanning the
Internet to a theoretical 3 minutes (Graham, 2013b).
The development of these two tools has made con-
ducting an Internet-wide scan easier, cheaper and
more effective. Both ZMap and Masscan are tools
designed specifically for conducting scans of the In-
ternet, and provide significant performance improve-
ments compared to NMap, a tool built for intensive
local network scanning.
In comparison to conducting Internet-wide scans,
the Shodan project allows users to bypass conduct-
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ing scans themselves, and use use information gath-
ered from conducting ports scans and banner grab-
bing to find information about specific target devices.
Users search the Shodan database using an interac-
tive web interface, and can search using queries de-
signed to restrict searches to a type of device, port,
or geographical location. Shodan captures informa-
tion about many devices, including SCADA, ICS, IP
cameras and routers (Shodan, 2014).
“KATSE” was a scanning system designed to scan
the nation of Finland to constantly search for ex-
posed, Internet-connected ICS and analyse the sys-
tems for possible vulnerabilities. KATSE, a several
component scanning system, scanned devices which
were found using Shodan (Tiilikainen, 2014).
The ZMap team at the University of Michigan re-
leased in August, 2014, an analysis of traffic dataset
received by a darknet over a 16 month period.
Through the use of libpcap, the traffic was analysed
and the team found that scans conducted targeting
10% or more of the IPv4 address space did not use
ZMap or Masscan (Durumeric et al., 2014).
Existing research projects using Internet-wide
scanning and surveying methods have been conducted
in the past few years. Several new methods of scan-
ning the internet have been developed, dramatically
reducing the time required to conduct a full Internet-
wide scan.
However, limited global Internet-wide scans have
been conducted specifically targeting ICS. Further-
more, limited comparison between the new Internet-
wide scanning methods have been conducted. The
majority of Internet-wide scans described have used
different methodologies and tools while conducting
scans of the Internet, several developing their own
tools to fulfil their research needs. Thus there is a
need to analyse and compare techniques through the
development of a Taxonomy and develop a Frame-
work for conducting Internet-wide scans. Addition-
ally, there exists the potential to scan the Internet to
view the current landscape of publicly available ICS,
through scanning the public IPv4 Internet for indus-
trial control system protocols.
3 Taxonomy of Internet Scanning Methods
Through our investigation of Internet-scanning tools
and previously conducted Internet-wide scans, we
have seen Zmap, Masscan and Unicornscan share a
large number of similarities. As such, we have dis-
tilled the following categorical breakdown of the Tax-
onomy of Scanning Methods. We have then compared
the properties of ZMap, Masscan and Unicornscan us-
ing our taxonomy, as shown in Table 1.
3.1 Scanning Method
We define Scanning Method in Internet-wides canning
as the method used by the scanners to connect, check
port availability and disconnect from a target host.
We categorise Scanning method into two categories:
scanners which conduct SYN-scaning, and scanners
which conduct complete 3-way handshakes.
Zmap utilises separate sending and receiving
threads for packet transmission, and uses SYN-
scanning for sending packets (Durumeric et al., 2013).
Masscan makes use of SYN-scanning, and like
ZMap and Unicornscan, uses separate sending and
receiving threads to transmit packets and receive re-
sponses.
Unicornscan conducts a full three-way handshake
while conducting a scan, and breaks down the process
of conducting scans into three processes. The main
process “Unicornscan” is used to control the scan and
keep track of packets,“unisend” which sends a SYN
packet to the scan target, and “unilisten”, which lis-
tens for the SYN-ACK response, and sends informa-
tion back to the master process “Unicornscan”.
3.2 Packet Transmission
We define Packet Transmission in Internet-wide scan-
ning as the method used by the scanner to send and
receive packets. We categorise Packet Transmission
in to three categories: scanners which use the kernel
TCP/IP stack, scanners which implement their own
self-contained “user-mode” TCP/IP stack, and scan-
ners which bypass the TCP/IP stack completely.
ZMap generates and sends packets using a raw
socket at the Ethernet layer, which reduces kernel
overhead and bypasses the TCP/IP stack. By gen-
erating and caching the Ethernet layer packet, ZMap
prevents the Linux kernel from performing a rout-
ing lookup, arpcache lookup, and netfilter checks for
each sent packet (Durumeric et al., 2013). Masscan
uses a user self contained TCP stack, separate from
the Linux kernel. In addition to this function, Mass-
can makes use of a kernel module “PF RING” to im-
prove packet transfer and capture speed. Unicorn-
scan’s method has similarities to Masscan, using a
user TCP stack outside of the kernel.
3.3 Randomisation
We define Randomisation as the ability of the scan-
ning tool to generate a random permutation of the
IPv4 address pool, preventing iterative scanning of
the IPv4 address space.
Traditional network scanning tools, such as NMap,
iteratively scan through a list of IP addresses. Due
to the methods new scanners use to generate packets,
more traffic is generated and transmitted faster, re-
ducing the time required to conduct an Internet-wide
scan. However, this results in the possible overload
of a destination network, potentially causing issues
to the normal operation of that network(Durumeric
et al., 2013).
ZMap uses a mathematic method for generating a
random permutation of the IPv4 address pool. Using
modular mathematics, ZMap iterates over a multi-
plicative group of integers, ensuring the scanner will
reach all IPv4 addresses, with exception to the ad-
dress 0.0.0.0, an IANA reserved address (Durumeric
et al., 2013). ZMap has recently been improved
by including parallelised generation of IP addresses
over multiple cores, allowing faster address genera-
tion (Adrian et al., 2014).
Masscan creates random permutations of the IPv4
address pool using a custom cryptographic algorithm
“Blackrock”, based on a Feistel network to encrypt an
index. The Blackrock encryption function is based on
Data Encryption Standard (DES) (Graham, 2013a).
ZMap and Masscan both have the ability to “seed”
the randomisation element of the scans, allowing the
random permutation of IP addresses to be repeatable.
From using Unicornscan to perform restricted lo-
cal network scans, we found Unicornscan does not
have a randomisation function, and scans iteratively
through addresses in the specified network range.
3.4 Scan Distribution
We define Scan Distribution in Internet-wide scan-
ning as the ability for the scanner to conduct dis-
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tributed scans from multiple source hosts. We cate-
gorise Scan Distribution into two categories: scanners
which can conduct distributed scans, and scanners
which cannot conduct distributed scans.
Both ZMap and Masscan have the ability to con-
duct distributed scans of the Internet, and use the
term “Shard” to describe the distributed hosts. ZMap
and Masscan have similar methods of conducting dis-
tributed scans; first a “seed” is set to specify the same
randomised address permutation over all hosts, then
assign multiple IP addresses to scan from. Unicorn-
scan does not have the ability to conduct a distributed
scan from multiple hosts.
3.5 Blacklisting and Whitelisting
We define Blacklisting in Internet-wide scanning as
a user created or edited list used to exclude IP ad-
dresses from scans, resulting with any address listed
in a blacklist not being scanned at any point. We de-
fine Whitelisting in Internet-wide scanning as a user
created or edited list used to specify a network range
to scan, resulting in only that address or range of
addresses being scanned.
We categorise Blacklisting and Whitelisting in to
four categories: scanners which can use blacklisting,
scanners which can use whitelisting, scanners which
can use both blacklisting and whitelisting, and fi-
nally scanners which can use neither blacklisting or
whitelisting.
ZMap can use both blacklisting and whitelist-
ing for Internet-wide scans (Durumeric et al., 2013).
Masscan can use blacklisting in the form of an “ex-
clude file”, but not whitelisting. Like ZMap, black-
listing is configured through a configuration file, ac-
cepting the same format as ZMap (Graham, 2013b).
Unlike ZMap and Masscan, Unicornscan does not im-
plement either blacklisting or whitelisting.
3.6 Modularity
We define modularity in Internet-wide scanning as
the scanner being extensible with internal or exter-
nal modules, to increase the functionality of the scan-
ner or provide some additional benefit. We categorise
modularity in to two categories: scanners which are
modular, and scanners which are not modular.
ZMap is a modular scanner, internally having a
series of extensible probe modules which can be cus-
tomised for different types of probes and payloads,
such as the UDP probe module (Durumeric et al.,
2013). In addition to the internal probe modules,
ZMap has output handlers which allow the scan re-
sults to be pushed into external modules to provide
additional processing. Neither Masscan or Unicorn-
scan have the ability to be extended with modules.
3.7 Scanning Speed
We define scanning speed in Internet-wide scanning
as the speed it is theoretically possible to conduct an
Internet-wide scan using a scanning tool. We cate-
gorise scanning speed in to three categories: 1gigE,
scanners which can theoretically scan up the limit of
1gbps Ethernet Cards, and 10gigE, scanners which
can theoretically scan up to the limit of 10gbps Eth-
ernet Cards. These differences are determined on net-
working
The receiving component of ZMap utilises libpcap,
a library for capturing network traffic and filtering
results. ZMap can send packets close to the theoreti-
cal limit of a 1gbps ethernet card, approximately 1.5
million packets-per-second (Mpps) (Durumeric et al.,
2013). Recently, ZMap has been further developed
and optimised, improving the performance of address
generation and “PF RING” resulting in the ability
to scan using a 10gbps network card, reaching simi-
lar speeds to Masscan at 15Mpps to 25Mpps (Adrian
et al., 2014).
Through the PF RING module, Masscan can use
up to 10gbps Ethernet card to send packets at a max-
imum of 15Mpps, or up to 25Mpps using a dual-port
10gbps Ethernet card (Graham, 2013b).
Unicornscan uses a similar method of sending
packets compared with Masscan, and additionally
uses the libpcap library for receiving network traffic.
(Lee and Louis, 2005). Using the same library, Uni-
cornscan would be able to send packets at the same
rate as ZMap, at approximately 1.5Mpps over a 1gbps
Ethernet card.
3.8 Speed Limiting
We define Speed Limiting in Internet-wide scanning
as the ability to slow or limit a scan’s speed, in order
to conduct the scan slower if necessary. We categorise
Speed Limiting in to four categories: limiting speed
by rate of scan in packets per second (pps) or band-
width (G,M,Kbps), limiting speed by duration of scan
(seconds), limiting speed by number of results, and
limiting speed through a combination of methods.
ZMap has the ability to limit the speed of a scan
by rate in packets per second (pps), by bandwidth in
bits per second (G,M,Kbps), limit number of hosts
and results, and by total time. Both Masscan and
Unicornscan can limit the rate of the scan in packets
per second, however neither Masscan or Unicornscan
can limit by amount of hosts, results, or time.
4 Internet-wide Scanning Framework
In this section, we present our framework for conduct-
ing Internet-wide scans. We present our framework in
four sections; a scan policy, a primary scan, secondary
scan, and scan analysis.
4.1 Scanning Policy
While developing the Internet-wide scanning tool
ZMap and conducting internet-wide scans as part of
research, the team at the University of Michigan de-
veloped a list of seven recommended practices for fu-
ture researchers to use as as guidelines for “Good
Internet Citizenship” (Durumeric et al., 2013). We
followed this list of recommended practices where
it was feasible while developing our policies. The
ZMap team’s guidelines for “Good Internet Citizen-
ship” were used as a base for implementing our two
policies for ensuring all required parties are aware of
any Internet-wide scans.
We have defined a clear policy to be used for com-
municating with internal groups at our ISP, ensuring
all required groups are informed of the Internet-wide
scans.
1. Request Ethics approval where necessary.
2. Inform and Discuss the nature and extent of the
scans with the ISP.
3. Coordinate network usage with the ISP to pre-
vent any disruption to normal network operation.
4. Coordinate with the ISP to ensure any emails
will be received and processed by the scanning
team.
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Properties ZMap Masscan Unicornscan
Scan Method SYN-scanning SYN-scanning 3-Way Handshake
Packet Transmission Bypass Kernel User-mode TCP/IP User-mode TCP/IP
Randomisation Uses Randomisation Uses Randomisation No Randomisation
Distributed Scanning Can conduct Can conduct Can not conduct
Black/Whitelisting Both Black & Whitelisting Blacklisting Neither
Scanning Speed 1gigE (10gigE as of August, 2014) 10gigE 1gigE
Speed Limiting Combination (Rate, Duration, Results) Rate of Scan (pps) Rate of Scan (pps)
Modularity Is modular Is not modular Is not modular
Table 1: Comparison of ZMap, Masscan and Unicornscan using our Taxonomy of Internet Scanning Methods.
In addition to this policy for working with internal
groups, we have defined a clear policy for working
with scan-traffic recipients to receive, and process any
requests for information or requests to opt-out of any
future scanning activities.
1. Maintain a constant, clear contact point for
receiving any information or opt-out requests,
through use of web pages, reverse-DNS and con-
tact email.
2. Respond to information or opt-out requests
promptly after receiving the request, ensuring re-
sponses are taken seriously.
3. Immediately add opt-out requests to an IP ad-
dress blacklist for future scans, and update black-
list as soon as possible.
4. Refine the address blacklist as needed if a repeat
request is received.
4.2 Primary Scan
The Internet-wide scanning framework has two scan-
ning stages, a primary scan and a secondary scan.
The primary scan is conducted to find a broader
range of hosts to be narrowed down by the secondary
scan. In the primary scan, an Internet-wide scan
is conducted using ZMap, Masscan, or Unicornscan,
against a port or ports necessary to obtain a range of
IP addresses for research. The main outcome of the
primary scan is a list of IP addresses to be used for
the secondary scans.
4.3 Secondary Scan
The Internet-wide scanning framework uses a sec-
ondary scanning stage to further identify the initial
hosts, in order to identify or gather more required
information from the hosts. The secondary scan is
conducted using the outcomes from the primary scan
on a second port or ports which are used by com-
mon services, that have the potential to identify the
devices. These services, when queried, can provide
information or banners containing software versions
and device information such as device name and type.
These ports include the web server port TCP/80,
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) port
TCP/161, Telnet port TCP/23 and File Transfer Pro-
tocol (FTP) port TCP/21. These protocols are com-
monly used to interact with ICS devices, for manag-
ing, accessign and uploading and downloading of files
to the devices. Using this list of ports, scanning a list
of IP addresses can return banners and status of the
device.
4.4 Scan Analysis
The Scan Analysis section of the framework is for
gathering insight from the results gained from the
primary and secondary scans, such as statistical infor-
mation, and geolocation information. Statistical in-
formation can be gathered from using standard UNIX
tools. ZMap, Masscan and Unicornscan output files
to multiple formats, and by default use a human read-
able format for viewing files. Extensions to these
tools, such as banner grabbing modules, have the abil-
ity to output to the human readable to ascii format.
Using unix tools such as grep, wc, diff, and comm,
information can be observed from the results; such
as how many IP addresses are in a range, and the
number of times a server appears in a banner grab.
Our scan analysis stage uses geographical IP ad-
dress information, retrieved from regional internet
registries (RIR). Geolocation software uses databases
of IP address data gathered from the RIR’s to allow
users of the software to search for geographic infor-
mation related to an IP address, such as the approxi-
mate geographical location (Fiori, 2014). The results
obtained through conducting primary and secondary
scans can be processed through a GeoIP Server, and
used as input to generate geographic maps of results
to visually display scan results.
5 Discussion
While designing the Framework for Primary and Sec-
ondary scans, we initially considered sending mes-
sages to industrial control system protocols. Based
on the responses we receive from the messages, we
could quickly eliminate what devices were not ICS.
However, this method of scanning would require us to
craft packets to send commands as a payload specif-
ically designed for the the destination protocol. A
scan using this method of crafting packets could be
construed as an attempted attack on the destination
system. In addition to the construed nature of the
scan, it is possible that commands sent to a desti-
nation industrial control system could potentially in-
terrupt the function of the device. Due to possible
misinterpretation of the messages, and the potential
of interrupting the function of the devices, we elim-
inated this method of scanning as a possible way of
identifying ICS. Instead, we designed the Secondary
Scan as a method for identifying ICS without the use
of specialised or crafted payloads.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by Australian Re-
search Council Linkage Grant LP120200246, Practi-
cal Cyber Security for Next Generation Power Trans-
mission Networks.
CRPIT Volume 161 - Information Security 2015
64
References
Adrian, D., Durumeric, Z., Singh, G. and Halderman,
J. A. (2014), Zipper ZMap: Internet-Wide Scan-
ning at 10Gbps, in ‘Proceedings of the 8th USENIX
Workshop on Offensive Technologies’.
Anonymous (2012), ‘Internet census 2012: Port
scanning/0 using insecure embedded devices.’.
URL: http:// internetcensus2012.bitbucket.org/
paper.html
Durumeric, Z., Bailey, M. and Halderman, J. A.
(2014), An Internet-Wide View of Internet-Wide
Scanning, in ‘Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Se-
curity Symposium’.
Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E. and Halderman, J. A.
(2013), ZMap: Fast Internet-wide scanning and its
security applications, in ‘Proceedings of the 22nd
USENIX Security Symposium’.
Electronic Frontier Foundation (2014), ‘The EFF SSL
Observatory’.
URL: https://www.eff.org/observatory
Fiori, A. (2014), ‘freegeoip.net’.
URL: http://freegeoip.net/
Graham, R. (2013a), ‘Masscan: designing my own
crypto’.
URL: http:// blog.erratasec.com/ 2013/ 12/
masscan-designing-my-own-crypto.html
Graham, R. (2013b), ‘Masscan: the entire internet in
3 minutes’.
URL: http:// blog.erratasec.com/ 2013/ 09/
masscan-entire-internet-in-3-minutes.html
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E. and Hal-
derman, J. A. (2012), Mining Your Ps and Qs: De-
tection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network De-
vices, in ‘Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Security
Symposium’.
Hoover, J. N. (2013), ‘Thousands of industrial control
systems at risk: Dhs study’.
URL: http://www.darkreading.com/risk-
management/thousands-of-industrial-control-
systems–at-risk-dhs-study/d/d-id/1108149?
Lee, R. and Louis, J. (2005), ‘Unicornscan - History,
Background and Technical Details’, Presentation.
Shodan (2014), ‘man shodan’.
URL: http:// www.shodanhq.com/ help
Tiilikainen, S. (2014), Improving the National Cyber-
security by Finding Vulnerable Industrial Control
Systems from the Internet.
Proceedings of the 13th Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2015), Sydney,
Australia, 27 - 30 January 2015
65
